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Abstract
Political institutions often use decision making procedures that create veto playersñindividuals or
groups who, despite lacking direct decision making authority, nevertheless have the power to block
policy change. In this paper we use the competitive policy development model of Hirsch and Shotts
(2015) to examine how the presence of veto players a§ects outcomes when policies are developed
endogenously. Consistent with spatial models of pivotal politics, veto players can induce gridlock,
which is harmful to a centrist decisionmaker. But they can also have more subtle e§ects. Some of
the e§ects are negativeñfor example, when the status quo is centrist, veto players dampen productive
policy competition because of their resistance to change. But some of the e§ects are surprisingly
positive. In particular, when the status quo beneÖts a veto player and there is a skilled policy
entrepreneur who is highly motivated change it, the veto player forces the entrepreneur to develop
a much higher quality proposal. This e§ect yields substantial beneÖts for a centrist decisionmaker.
We also show that veto players can induce asymmetric patterns of policy development, with much
greater activity by the faction that is more dissatisÖed with the status quo.
1 Introduction
In political organizations, the need to accommodate many competing stakeholders often results
in decisionmaking procedures that create veto playersñindividuals or groups who, despite lacking
direct decisionmaking authority, nevertheless have the power to block policy change. For example,
chief executives often have constitutionally-granted veto powers (Cameron 2000); supermajority
procedures in legislatures, parliaments, and commissions generate implicit veto pivots (Krehbiel
1998, Brady and Volden 1998, Diermeier and Myerson 1999, Tsebelis 2002); and bureaucracies are
sometimes structured so that an agency must seek the approval of another agency or interest group
before it can act (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987, Moe 1989).
Despite the ubiquity of procedures that create veto players, commentators on the political process
are of two minds about their consequences. Recent debates over the Ölibuster in the U.S. Senateñ
where supermajority rules to limit debate (i.e. invoke cloture) e§ectively create veto playersñprovide
an illustration. Proponents of the Ölibuster have argued that greater hurdles to policy enactment
encourage constructive deliberation (Arenberg and Dove 2012). Opponents complain about the
ability of the minority party to obstruct majority-supported resolutions, and have recently taken the
dramatic step of eliminating supermajority cloture on most Senate conÖrmations.1
In this paper, we extend the model of policy entrepreneurship developed in Hirsch and Shotts
(2015a) to understand these competing e§ects. The policy process is modeled as an open forum in
which a decisionmaker relies on one or more policy-motivated groups, known as entrepreneurs, to
develop new proposals. Rather than promise policy-contingent transfers or furnish general policy-
relevant information,2 the entrepreneurs gain support for their proposals by making costly, up-front,
and policy-speciÖc investments in their quality. Quality reáects characteristics of policies that are
valued by all players, such as cost savings, promotion of economic growth, or e¢cient and non-
corrupt administration. In the original model, competition beneÖts the sole decisionmaker because
it prevents an entrepreneur from extracting all the beneÖts of her quality investments in the form of
ideological concessions. Surprisingly, the beneÖts of competition are greatest when the competing
entrepreneurs are ideologically polarized, because they have the strongest incentive to invest in quality
to realize ideological gains.
In the present paper, we analyze how the inclusion of veto players in decisionmaking a§ects
this process. Veto players create additional hurdles to policy change, because they have the power
to block proposals that they Önd less desirable than the status quo. The e§ect of veto players on
the policymaking environment is not obvious. The entrepreneurs could endogenously respond to
additional hurdles either productively (by moderating their proposals and investing more in quality
1ìReid, Demoncrats trigger ënuclearí option,î Washington Post, November 21, 2013.
2See Grossman and Helpman (2001) for a review of both theories of ináuence.
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to gain their support) or destructively (by reducing their investments in policy development).
In our analysis, we also consider how competition interacts with the inclusion of veto players
to a§ects a centrist decisionmakerís welfare. In particular, we consider the e§ect of veto players in
both monopoly policy environmentsñwhere only a single entrepreneur has the capacity to develop
new proposalsñand competitive policy environmentsñwhere multiple competing groups can simul-
taneously develop new proposals. The monopoly variant of the model captures policymaking in
states where institutional capacity is highly asymmetric (see Londreganís (2000) description of the
Chilean presidency), or on issues exhibiting ìclient politicsî where only one interest group is orga-
nized (Wilson 1989). The competitive variant captures policymaking on issues exhibiting ìinterest
group politicsî where multiple competing groups are organized.
Our analysis generates several results about how veto players a§ect the quality and ideology of
policy outcomes. First, we show that a necessary condition for the decisionmaker to beneÖt from
the presence of veto players is that their ideological preferences counterbalance those of a potential
entrepreneur. Because a counterbalancing veto player is more opposed to a potential entrepreneurís
desired change than the decisionmaker, he can encourage that entrepreneur to both moderate her
policy proposals, and to invest more in quality. The intuition is natural, and closely resembles
that of bargaining models in which a player can beneÖt by delegating decisionmaking to a player
with more extreme preferences (e.g., Fershtman, Judd, and Kalai 1991). It di§ers notably, however,
from information-based models, in which expertise takes the form of private information about an
unknown state of the world; those models typically suggest that experts should be protected to
encourage investment in and truthful revelation of information. A key reason for this distinction is
that quality in our model is speciÖc to a single policy, and cannot be expropriated to improve other
proposals with distinct ideologies.3
Once this counterbalancing condition is met, the potential beneÖts of veto players depend on
the willingness and ability of potential entrepreneurs to develop alternative proposals. If some
entrepreneur is very skilled at developing high quality policies and is highly dissatisÖed with the
status quo, then the presence of a counterbalancing veto player can beneÖt the decisionmaker by
extracting greater moderation and/or quality from that entrepreneur. However, harmful gridlock
can instead result if veto players and entrepreneurs are all reasonably satisÖed with the status quo
and relatively unskilled at developing high quality policies.
The preceding patterns obtain in both monopolistic and competitive policy environments, but
the resulting predictions are subtly di§erent. In monopoly policy environments, the presence of veto
players is most harmful when they allow a monopolist policy entrepreneur to protect a non-centrist
3Canonical works in the informational literature are Crawford and Sobel (1982) and Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987).
Hirsch and Shotts (2012) discuss policy-speciÖc quality and implications for committee organization, and Hirsch and
Shotts (2015b) discuss implications for other policymaking institutions.
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status quo that beneÖts her. In competitive policy environments, in contrast, any non-centrist
status quo is disliked by at least one entrepreneur, and veto players generate the greatest harm when
the status quo is centrist. Under these conditions, no one entrepreneur is su¢ciently motivated to
overcome the additional barriers created by the veto players; instead, their demands dampen the
intensity of productive competition over policy that would otherwise result.
The competitive variant of the model also generates insights about how veto players ináuence
observable patterns of competition. In the absence of veto players, equilibria must be symmetric when
the entrepreneurs are equally extreme and able (Hirsch and Shotts 2015a). Veto players, however,
can also generate asymmetries in activity between otherwise-symmetric entrepreneurs because they
may be attempting to protect a non-centrist status quo. In particular, when the status quo is
very lopsided in the direction of one entrepreneur, she has little motivation to develop an alternative
policy, while her opponent has a strong motivation to do so. The equilibrium consequence is that the
ìsatisÖedî entrepreneur near the status quo is largely or completely inactive, while the ìdissatisÖedî
entrepreneur far from the status quo always develops a new policy for consideration. The model
thus generates a natural and intuitive pattern often seen in real-world politics; it is the faction
with the greatest interest in changing the status quo that is most active in proposing and investing
in a credible policy alternative, while the faction that beneÖts more from the status quo is less
constructively involved in policy development.
Finally, we observe that in the competitive model, the decisionmaker actually beneÖts most from
the presence of veto players when there is no observable competition between policy developers. The
reason is that the absence of competition reáects the strong willingness of one faction to invest in
changing a lopsided status quo, rather than exogenous constraints on her competitorís ability to
participate in policymaking. An important implication of this observation is that the absence of
observable competition in policy development is not prima facie evidence of political dysfunction. It
can instead simply reáect competing groupsí di§erential willingness to invest in policy development
given their skills and preferences as well as the location of the status quo.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 summarizes related literature. Section 3 introduces the
model and analyzes how veto players a§ect the set of feasible policies that can be adopted. Section 4
analyzes the e§ect of veto players when there is a single policy entrepreneur, and Section 5 analyzes
the e§ect of veto players in a competitive environment. Section 6 applies the model to discuss the
e§ects of Ölibusters in the U.S. Senate, and Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Our model relates to several literatures. The Örst considers how constraints on a decisionmakerís
discretion in various contexts can improve her welfare by helping solve dynamic inconsistency prob-
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lems, such as committing to low ináation; such constraints include delegating decisionmaking (Rogo§
1985) and employing supermajority rules (Dal Bo 2006). Our analysis, in contrast, considers how
constraints on a decisionmakerís discretion can improve the set of alternatives from which she selects
by ináuencing the behavior of other strategic actors.
A large and diverse literature also considers the consequences of employing supermajority rules in
decisionmaking. While our analysis does not directly consider voting rules, our model can be mapped
from a collective choice setting where individuals have two-dimensional preferences over ideology and
quality; the individual with the median ideology acts as the decisionmaker, and supermajority rules
e§ectively create veto pivots on either side (Krehbiel 1998; Brady and Volden 1998). Among the
many rationales for the supermajority rules are stability (Caplin and Nalebu§ 1998; Barbera and
Jackson 2004), balanced budgets (Alesina and Tabellini 1990), minority protections (Aghion and
Bolton 2003), insulation of the executive (Aghion, Alesina, and Trebbi 2004), intergenerational
conáict (Messner and Polborn 2004), information acquisition and aggregation (Persico 2004), and
maximizing campaign contributions (Diermeier and Myerson 1999).
Our work also relates to previous research on veto players and blocking coalitions (Krehbiel 1998;
Brady and Volden 1998; Crombez 1996; Tsebelis 2002). The vast majority of this research adopts
a purely-ideological model of policy choice. In contrast, an important feature of our model is that
policies have an endogenous quality dimension, and thus there exists the possibility for ìvote buyingî
by developing high-quality policies.4
Also important in our model is that quality is policy-speciÖc, rather than being applicable to
policies anywhere in the ideological spectrum. Thus our model contrasts with the many political
economy models that build on Crawford and Sobelís (1982) classic model, in which the information
necessary to tailor a liberal policy is exactly the same as the information necessary to tailor a
conservative one. The Brownian motion approach developed by Callander (2008, 2011a, 2011b)
is more similar to our model, but his model is purely spatial, whereas we model quality directly.
In doing this, we build on models of policymaking by Londregan (2000), Bueno de Mesquita and
Stephenson (2007), Lax and Cameron (2007), Ting (2011), and Hirsch and Shotts (2012). A key
feature of all of these models is that, in contrast to the Crawford and Sobel model, an expert is able
to exert informal agenda power by creating high-quality policies.
Finally, because the cost of investing in quality is paid up-front, our model with competing
entrepreneurs relates to previous research on all-pay contests (Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries 1993;
Che and Gale 2003; Siegel 2009). Entrepreneurs simultaneously make up-front payments to generate
4The version of our model with only one entrepreneur is technically similar to Snyderís (1991) model of vote-buying
without price discrimination; the entrepreneur must always produce enough quality to gain the support of the veto
player most opposed to the desired policy change. Our model di§ers, however, in that beneÖts spill over to other
policymakers because quality is a public good.
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proposals with two dimensions (ideology and quality), and the decisionmaker chooses among them
subject to the veto constraint. Our model has two primary di§erences from most previous contest
models, both of which complicate the equilibrium analysis. The Örst di§erence is that, as in Hirsch
and Shotts (2015a) the entrepreneurs in our model are policy-motivated rather than rent seeking;
the loser of the contest thus cares about the exact policy which is implemented. In the terminology
of Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries (2012) the model features second-order rank order spillovers. It
is thus better tailored than previous contest models to political environments, where actors have
opposing particularistic interests yet also have a shared interest in the collective outcome. A second
di§erence that distinguishes our model from most previous contest models is that it features players
without direct decisionmaking power who can block policy proposals. The presence of veto players
implies that developing quality can be strategically-productive to the entrepreneurs in more than
one way.5 SpeciÖcally, an entrepreneur can be motivated to produce more quality both to improve
the odds that the decisionmaker prefers her policy to others, and to gain the consent of veto players.
Both of these incentives a§ect the equilibrium policies developed in the model.
3 The Model
Our model builds on the two-stage game of policy entrepreneurship in Hirsch and Shotts (2015a).
Policies in the model have two components: ideology y 2 R and quality q 2 [0;1) = R+. Thus, a
policy is a point in a subset of two-dimensional real space, b = (y; q) 2 R # R+ = B. All playersí
utility functions Ui (b) over the two dimensions are additive, and quality is valued equally by all
players. SpeciÖcally,
Ui (b) = q $ (xi $ y)2 ;
where xi denotes player iís ideological ideal point.
Policy Development In the policy development stage of the game, each of up to two entrepreneurs
i 2 N % 2 may simultaneously choose to invest costly resources to develop a new policy bi = (yi; qi) 2
B with ideology yi and quality qi & 0. The marginal cost to entrepreneur i of developing quality
is )i, and it exceeds the entrepreneurís own marginal beneÖt from that quality, i.e., )i > 1. Thus,
an entrepreneur will not choose to invest costly resources in developing quality unless doing so will
increase the probability that her policy will be chosen.
Policy Choice In the policy choice stage of the game, the organization either chooses a policy
from the set of newly-developed policies b 2 BN , or retains a status quo policy b0 = (y0; q0). For
5This property of the model is related to Siegel (2014), who analyzes contests in which a playerís e§ort a§ects her
probability of winning and is also directly-productive, in that it a§ects her utility even if she doesnít win.
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simplicity, we assume that the status quo is of low quality (q0 = 0).
In the original model of competitive entrepreneurship in Hirsch and Shotts (2015a), policy is
chosen by a single decisionmaker. In the present model we augment this decisionmaking process with
j 2 K veto players with ideal points denoted xV j . SpeciÖcally, a decisionmaker with ideal ideology
xD = 0 Örst makes a take-it-or-leave-it proposal from the set of available policies. Then, if any veto
player rejects the proposal, the status quo policy b0 prevails. Because the decisionmaker always has
implicit veto authority by virtue of her proposal power, we simplify notation and terminology by
assuming that the set of veto players includes the decisionmaker. In addition, we use xV l % 0 and
xV r & 0 to denote the ideal ideologies of the leftmost and rightmost veto players.
Finally, we assume that the status quo policy b0 is not Pareto-dominated among the veto play-
ers by any 0-quality policy. This assumption is shorthand for three implicit assumptions: (i) the
organization can choose o§-the-shelf zero-quality policies that are costless to develop, (ii) quality is
policy-speciÖc in the sense that it cannot be transferred across policies with di§erent ideologies, and
(iii) policy is stable absent e§ort by the entrepreneurs to develop something new.
3.1 The E§ect of Veto Players on Decisionmaking
In the absence of veto players, the status quo must reáect the preferences of the decisionmaker by
assumption, i.e., y0 = 0. In order to get an alternative policy bi implemented, an entrepreneur only
needs to ensure that it is preferred by the unitary decisionmaker to this status quo, as well as to
all other available alternatives. This is depicted in the top panel of Figure 1, in which the set of
acceptable policies is located above the decisionmakerís indi§erence curve through his ideal point
with 0 quality.
The presence of veto players creates additional hurdles to policy change, and this a§ects the
policymaking process in two ways. First, as in standard in pivotal politics models, it expands
the range of potential status quos that entrepreneurs may face when they enter the policymaking
process; the status quo may be noncentrist (y0 6= 0) because a veto player previously blocked the
decisionmaker from altering it. SpeciÖcally, y0 can be located anywhere between the leftmost veto
player, xV l % 0; and the rightmost veto player, xV r & 0. Because the status quo may not perfectly
reáect the decisionmakerís preferences, he will be more receptive to the entrepreneursí new proposals.
This is illustrated in the middle panel of Figure 1. To gain the decisionmakerís support over the
status quo, the entrepreneurs must only develop policies above the decisionmakerís indi§erence curve
through y0 6= 0, which is strictly lower than the curve in the top panel.
However, for change to occur, the decisionmakerís support is no longer su¢cient; a new policy
also must be acceptable in lieu of the status quo to all veto players, who are collectively more opposed
to policy change. This can be seen in the middle panel of Figure 1 by observing that the veto playersí
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indi§erence curves through the status quo y0 are steeper than the decisionmakerís. To avoid a veto,
the decisionmaker is constrained to choosing her favorite policy that is above the upper envelope of
these two indi§erence curvesñwe shade this region, and henceforth refer to it as the veto proof set.
The net e§ect of including veto players in the decisionmaking process is thus to simultaneously
raise and lower the hurdles to policy change; the shift in the set of acceptable policies is illustrated
in the bottom panel of Figure 1. Policies near a noncentrist status quo become acceptable because
the decisionmaker cannot alter this status quo on her own. However, policies far from a noncentrist
status quo become unacceptable because a veto player will block them. The equilibrium e§ect
of including veto players in the decisionmaking process thus hinges on how the shift a§ects the
entrepreneursí strategic incentives to invest in quality. It may make them less willing to invest, if
they are favorably disposed to the status quo or unwilling to satisfy the additional demands of the
veto players. It may also make them more willing to invest, if they strongly dislike the status quo,
and are willing to invest in quality to change policy.
Notation To characterize how veto players a§ect the game, it is helpful to introduce additional
notation and terminology. As in Hirsch and Shotts (2015a) we call the decisionmakerís utility for
a policy its score s (y; q) = UD (y; q) = q $ y2. Absent veto players, the score of the status quo
is s (0; 0) = 0, and the decisionmaker will choose the policy with the highest score subject to the
constraint that it is & 0.
The inclusion of veto players both shifts the range of acceptable scores, and restricts the set of
acceptable policies given each score; the following deÖnition describes the veto-proof set in terms of
scores.
DeÖnition 1 Let xV l % 0 and xV r & 0 denote the leftmost and rightmost veto players, and deÖne
zL (s) = y0 $ s$ s0
2 jxV rj and zR (s) = y0 +
s$ s0
2 jxV lj
where s0 = $y20 is the score of the status quo. A policy (s; y) with score s and ideology y (and hence
quality q = s+ y2) is veto-proof i.f.f. y 2 YV (s) = [zL (s) ; zR (s)].6
Figure 2 illustrates the veto-proof set for a particular conÖguration of status quo and veto players.
The decisionmakerís indi§erence curves, i.e., the policies with equal score, are depicted by the green
lines. When veto players are present, some policies with scores 2 !$y20; 0" become acceptable that
would not have been acceptable in their absence. However, because the veto players are collectively
more opposed to ideological change than the decisionmaker, on any given score curve s the range of
6When xV l = 0 let zR (s) be deÖned as + 1, and when xV r = 0 let zL (s) be "1:
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veto-proof policies is an interval YV (s) = [zL (s) ; zR (s)].7 The right boundary zR (s) is determined
by the ideology of leftmost veto player xV l because he is most opposed to rightward policy changes,
while the left boundary zL (s) is determined by the rightmost veto player xV r. Described using
this notation, the e§ect of veto players on the set of acceptable policies is to increase the range of
acceptable scores (from [0;+1] to [$y20;+1)), but to shrink the set of acceptable ideologies given
each score (from [$1;+1] to [zL (s) ; zR (s)]). The decisionmakerís problem is thus to choose the
policy b = (y; q) with the highest score s (y; q) among the ones developed by the entrepreneurs,
subject to the constraint that it is veto proof, i.e., y 2 [zL (s (y; q)) ; zR (s (y; q))].
4 Monopolistic Policy Environments
We begin the equilibrium analysis by studying monopolistic policymaking environments, in which
only a single individual or group has the capacity to develop new high quality proposals. De facto
policy development monopolies arise in many issue areas and institutional environments, for a variety
of reasons. First, they may be a consequence of one actorís singular capacity or expertise. For
example, Londregan (2000) describes the Chilean President as an e§ective policy monopolist vis
a vis the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, and Johnson (1982) characterizes the Ministry
of International Trade and Industry (MITI) in Japan as a monopolist over industrial policy in
the 1960s and 1970s.8 Second, monopolies can arise when interests on one side of an issue are
unable or unwilling to organize due to collective action problems, which leads to regulatory capture
(Stigler 1971) or client politics (Wilson 1989). Finally, monopolies may be the consequence of
formal institutional rules or informal norms; for example, the European Commission historically had
a monopoly on developing proposals for the Council of Ministers and Parliament (Crombez 1996).
We Örst characterize the unique equilibrium of the monopoly model for any conÖguration of
parameters, including the absence of veto players. We then apply this analysis to analyze how
various conÖgurations of veto players a§ect the policy process.
7The role of a score in the competitive model with veto players is subtly di§erent from both Hirsch and Shotts
(2015) and Siegel (2009). In both of those contests, a bidder never wishes to produce a higher score than necessary
to beat her competitors. In the present contest, a bidder may strictly prefer to do so in order to satisfy the veto
constraint. This property signiÖcantly complicates the equilibrium analysis but is essential for our main insights, and
is shared with Siegelís (2014) analysis of contests with productive e§ort.
8A monopoly does not have to be anchored in formal proposal rightsñin Hirsch and Shotts (2015a), we show that
the competitive policy development equilibrium when one entrepreneur is at the decisionmakerís ideal point is the
same as if the other entrepreneur is a monopolist.
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4.1 Equilibrium Characterization
In a monopoly environment, the lone entrepreneur Eís policy (yE ; qE) need only be veto proof to be
chosen. Given a particular status quo y0, exactly one veto player (which could be the decisionmaker)
will be the binding veto player for the direction of change desired by the entrepreneur. If the
entrepreneur wishes to move the status quo rightward (xE > y0) then the leftmost veto player xV l % 0
will be binding; in the other direction, the rightmost veto player xV r & 0 will be binding. Henceforth
we use xbV E to denote the ideal ideology of the binding veto player given an entrepreneur xE , status
quo y0, and collection of veto players K (inclusive of the decisionmaker). The resulting equilibrium
is as follows.
Proposition 1 In monopolistic policy environments, the status quo y0 may be located anywhere
between the leftmost and rightmost veto players [xV l; xV r]. Let y^!E denote the weighted midpoint
1
,E
xE +
#
1$ 1,E
$
xbV E between entrepreneur xE and the binding veto player xbV E.
(Case 1 - Active Entrepreneurship) If the status quo y0 is on the opposite side of the weighted
midpoint y^!E from the entrepreneur, then the equilibrium ideological outcome is the weighted
midpoint y!E = y^
!
E.
(Case 2 - Gridlock) If the status quo y0 is on the same side of the weighted midpoint y^!E as the
entrepreneur, then the equilibrium ideological outcome is the status quo y!E = y0.
The decisionmakerís utility is s!E = s0 + 2 jxbV E (y!E $ y0)j, and quality is q!E = s!E + (y!E)2.
The intuition for the equilibrium is simple; examples are depicted in Figure 3. Consider an
entrepreneur who wishes to move the status quo rightward (xE > y0). To make some ideological
location yE acceptable to the decisionmaker as well as all veto players in lieu of the status quo, she
must generate enough quality to satisfy the leftmost veto player, i.e., xbV E = xV l % 0, since he is the
most opposed to rightward ideological movements. The entrepreneur will only develop policies on
the right boundary of the veto proof set, i.e., yE = zR (s (yE ; qE)). When deciding which policy to
develop, the entrepreneur will trace along the right boundary of the veto proof set until she reaches
the ideological location where the marginal beneÖt of additional ideological gains equals the marginal
cost of investing in enough quality to compensate the leftmost veto player. This critical ideological
location is the weighted midpoint y^!E =
1
,E
xE +
#
1$ 1,E
$
xV l. The better is the entrepreneur at
developing quality (lower )E), the closer this will be to her own ideal point. Finally, if the status
quo is already to the right of the weighted midpoint, the entrepreneur will protect it rather than
engage in entrepreneurship, and gridlock will prevail.
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4.2 Monopoly With a Single Decisionmaker
When there is a single decisionmaker, he is the binding veto player whose support the monopoly
entrepreneur must gain (i.e. xV l = xV r = 0). The status quo will be located at his ideal point
(y0 = s0 = 0), and the entrepreneur will wish to move it towards xE . Applying Proposition 1, the
equilibrium is as follows.
Corollary 1 In monopolistic policy environments with a single decisionmaker, the entrepreneur
develops a policy with ideological location y!E =
xE
,E
and quality q!E =
#
xE
,E
$2
. The decisionmaker
adopts the policy and receives equilibrium utility s (y!E ; q
!
E) = 0 = s0.
In the equilibrium, the entrepreneur e§ectively behaves as an agenda setter. However, her power
isnít a consequence of formal agenda rights, as in Romer and Rosenthal (1978). Rather, her power is
informal, as in Aghion and Tirole (1997), and results from her monopoly ability to produce higher-
quality policies. Because she only needs to satisfy the decisionmaker, she only invests in exactly the
minimum level of quality qE = y2E necessary to compensate him for his ideological losses relative
to his own ideal with 0 quality, i.e., s
%
yE ; y
2
E
&
= 0 = s0. The equilibrium is depicted in Figure 4.
The quality of the resulting policy q!E =
#
xE
,E
$2
strictly exceeds that of the status quo b0 = (0; 0),
but the ideological outcome also moves away from the decisionmakerís ideal to y!E =
xE
,E
. Despite a
higher-quality policy, the decisionmaker is no better o§ than absent the entrepreneur, because the
entrepreneur extracts all the beneÖts in the form of ideological rents. As the entrepreneur becomes
more extreme or her marginal cost of quality )E goes down, her equilibrium policy becomes more
ideologically extreme and the rents she extracts UE (0; 0)$ UE
'
xE
,E
;
#
xE
,E
$2(
=
x2E
,E
from exploiting
her monopoly on policy development capacity go up.
Thus, when one entrepreneur has the monopoly ability (or right) to generate high-quality pro-
posals and there is a single decisionmaker, the entrepreneur e§ectively exploits that ability to fully
extract the beneÖts of quality. This is the problem of monopolyña decisionmaker who could theoret-
ically implement any policy of her choosing is nevertheless forced to make ideological concessions to
access a monopolistís expertise. Knowing this, the entrepreneur will exercise informal agenda setting
power by developing high-quality proposals that also aggressively promote her ideological objectives,
leaving the decisionmaker no better o§ than in the absence of her expertise.9
4.3 Monopoly with Veto Players
When can the presence of veto players beneÖt the decisionmaker by helping him capture some of
the rents that a monopoly entrepreneur would otherwise extract? To answer this question, we
9See Hirsch and Shotts (2015b) for an applied analysis of policy-development monopolies.
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consider two speciÖc subcases. The Örst case considers a unitary veto player. This could represent,
for example, an executive who can veto bills passed by a legislature. The second case considers
two veto players located symmetrically about the decisionmaker. This could be a consequence of
supermajority rules in a collective choice body, which create two veto points located on either side of
the medianñone whose consent implies supermajority support for a leftward policy shift, and another
whose consent implies supermajority support for a rightward policy shift (Brady and Volden 1988,
Krehbiel 1998).10
In the subsequent analysis we assume without loss of generality that the entrepreneur is to the
right of the decisionmaker (xE > 0). We also assume that the veto players are more moderate than
the entrepreneur (jxV j j % xE ; 8j). Intuitively, this assumption captures scenarios where there is a
single well-funded interest group with extreme preferences relative to a low-capacity government.
4.3.1 A Single Veto Player
There are two possible conÖgurations of a single veto player. We say that she is aligned with the
entrepreneur when xV 2 [0; xE ], because compared to the decisionmaker, she is more supportive
of policy movements toward the entrepreneur. In contrast, we say that she counterbalances the
entrepreneur when xV < xD < xE , because she is more opposed to policy movements toward
the entrepreneur. The following proposition characterizes when the decisionmaker beneÖts from the
presence of a single veto player.
Proposition 2 In the model with a single veto player:
1. if the veto player is aligned with the entrepreneur (xV 2 [0; xE ]), the decisionmaker is strictly
better o§ eliminating her regardless of the status quo or the entrepreneurís costs. Doing so
makes policy strictly higher quality and weakly more moderate.
2. if the veto player counterbalances the entrepreneur (xV < 0),
(a) the decisionmaker is better o§ eliminating the veto player if the entrepreneur has high
costs
#
)E & 2
#
1 + xEjxV j
$$
, or if she has moderate costs
#
)E 2
h
1 + xEjxV j ; 2
#
1 + xEjxV j
$i$
and the status quo is su¢ciently close to the entrepreneur, i.e. y0 > +y0, where
+y0 = jxV j *
 s'
2
'
1 +
xE
jxV j
(
* )#1E $ 1
(
$ 1
!
< 0
10For supermajority rules to create well-deÖned pivots in our model requires the preservation of a single crossing
property; utility functions of the form we assume are su¢cient but not necessary.
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(b) the decisionmaker is better o§ maintaining the veto player if the entrepreneur has low
costs
#
)E % 1 + xEjxV j
$
, or if she has moderate costs
#
)E 2
h
1 + xEjxV j ; 2
#
1 + xEjxV j
$i$
and
the status quo is su¢ciently far from the entrepreneur, i.e., y0 < +y0.
The proposition Örst states that a veto player who is aligned with the entrepreneur never beneÖts the
decisionmaker; this case is depicted in Figure 5. Such a veto player simply stacks the deck in favor
of the entrepreneur by protecting a status quo y0 > xD that is favorable for her, while providing no
additional hurdle to policy change. That is, he increases the range of acceptable scores, but does
not tighten the right boundary of the veto proof set (zR (s) = +1 8s) because the decisionmaker is
more opposed to policy movements rightward. The result is either the same policy xE,E that would
prevail absent the veto player but with lower quality (as depicted in Figure 5), or collusion between
the aligned veto player and the entrepreneur to protect a noncentrist status quo.
The proposition next states that a veto player who counterbalances the entrepreneur is necessary,
but not su¢cient, for the decisionmaker to beneÖt. Such a veto player generates a cost for the
decisionmaker of $y20 by initially protecting a noncentrist status quo. However, his greater opposition
to the change desired by the entrepreneur can also force the entrepreneur to moderate her policy,
invest more in quality, or both. These e§ects generate a spillover beneÖt to the decisionmaker of
2 jxV j (y!E $ y0), where y!E is the weighted midpoint between the entrepreneur and the veto player.
Whether this spillover beneÖt is su¢cient for the decisionmaker to be better o§ with the veto player
present depends on both the entrepreneurís willingness to invest in quality to generate ideological
change (i.e., her distance from the status quo y0), and her ability to invest in quality to generate
ideological change (i.e., her cost of developing quality )E).
If the entrepreneurís costs are very low (i.e., she is high-ability), the decisionmaker is better o§
with a counterbalancing veto player regardless of the location of the status quo. An example is
depicted in the top panel of Figure 6, in which the veto player counterbalances the entrepreneur but
is more ideologically moderate, the entrepreneur is high ability
#
)E < 1 +
xE
jxV j
$
, and the status quo
is at the decisionmakerís ideal y0 = 0. The weighted midpoint y!E between the entrepreneur and
the veto player is to the right of 0, and the veto playerís indi§erence curve through the status quo,
i.e. zR (s), is steeper than that of the decisionmaker. Consequently, the resulting policy with a veto
player is both higher quality and more moderate than what would prevail in her absence.
If the entrepreneurís costs are very high, then the decisionmaker is worse o§ with the counter-
balancing veto player present even when the status quo is as far from the entrepreneur as possible
(y0 = xV ), and the entrepreneur has the greatest incentive to change policy. This is depicted in the
middle panel of Figure 6, where )E > 2
#
1 + xEjxV j
$
. The entrepreneur generates a new policy that is
distinct from the status quo and higher quality, but the policy is so ideologically extreme due to the
opposition of the veto player that the decisionmaker would be better o§ eliminating the veto player
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entirely.
Finally, if the entrepreneurís costs are moderate, then the decisionmaker only beneÖts if the
status quo y0 is su¢ciently far from the entrepreneur and close to the veto player (i.e. y0 < +y0 < 0).
This is depicted in the bottom panel of Figure 6, where )E 2
h
1 + xEjxV j ; 2
#
1 + xEjxV j
$i
. For the
particular status quo depicted (at the midpoint between the veto player and the decisionmaker) the
decisionmaker is better o§ with the veto player present. However, if the status quo were closer to the
entrepreneur then the decisionmaker would be worse o§ in equilibrium, because the entrepreneur
would not produce su¢cient quality to overcome the costs of a noncentrist policy outcome. The
dotted purple line depicts the possible locations of the equilibrium policy outcome, depending on
the location of the status quo.
Overall, the following results emerge. A necessary condition for the veto player to be beneÖcial
for the decisionmaker is that he counterbalances the entrepreneur. When this condition holds, the
decisionmaker beneÖts if and only if the combination of the entrepreneurís willingness to engage in
entrepreneurship (a distant y0), and ability to engage in entrepreneurship (a low )E) is su¢ciently
strong.
4.3.2 Multiple Symmetric Veto Players
The preceding analysis focuses on the consequences of including a single veto player in the de-
cisionmaking process. However, creating a single veto player is often not possible; many de-
cisionmaking procedures simultaneously give rise to multiple veto players because they extend
rights to groups rather than individuals. We now consider the consequences of including two veto
players in the decisionmaking process who are located symmetrically about the decisionmaker, so
$xV l = xV r = xV > 0. This could arise, for example, in a collective decisionmaking body with
symmetrically distributed preferences and a supermajority rule; the extremism of the veto players
xV would be increasing in the supermajority threshold. Symmetric veto players may also be inter-
preted as a generic representation of the dispersion of decisionmaking power in an organization; the
more members of the organization have veto power, the more ideologically extreme will be the most
extreme of those members.
Proposition 3 Let xV denote the ideological extremism of symmetric veto players at $xV and xV .
+ The decisionmaker is better o§ eliminating the veto players if the entrepreneur has high costs#
)E > 2
#
1 + xExV
$$
.
+ The decisionmaker is better o§ maintaining the veto players if they are both su¢ciently mod-
erate
%
xV <
2
3xE
&
and the entrepreneur has very low costs
#
)E <
2
5
#
1 + xExV
$$
.
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+ Otherwise, the decisionmaker is better o§ maintaining the veto players if and only if the status
quo is su¢ciently far from the entrepreneur, i.e., y0 < +y0 as previously deÖned.
In addition, the decisionmaker is always weakly better o§ with a single counterbalancing entre-
preneur at $xV than he is with symmetric veto players at ($xV ; xV ).
With symmetric veto players, both an aligned and counterbalancing veto player are simultane-
ously present; the counterbalancing veto player makes it more costly for the entrepreneur to shift any
status quo point rightward, but the aligned veto player can also stack the deck in the entrepreneurís
favor by protecting status quo points y0 2 [0; xE ]. Thus, results are similar to the case of a single
veto player but with a few subtle di§erences.
First, it remains true that veto players are counterproductive when the entrepreneur is high-cost;
symmetric veto players can never be better than a single counterbalancing veto player, because
the additional veto player protects status quo points aligned with the entrepreneur. Second, the
entrepreneur must be even more skilled at developing quality than in the counterbalancing case for
the decisionmaker to unconditionally beneÖt from the veto playersí presence. This is because the
aligned veto player protects additional status quo points that are closer to the entrepreneur; thus for
the decisionmaker to beneÖt from the combined presence of the two veto players, the entrepreneur
must be very skilled and the veto players must not be too extreme.
Overall, the intuitions with a single counterbalancing veto player and with symmetric veto players
are similar. The decisionmaker beneÖts when the entrepreneur is highly skilled and/or su¢ciently
dissatisÖed with the status quo. However, the beneÖts are overall lower than for a single counterbal-
ancing veto player because the additional veto player protects more status quo points aligned with
the entrepreneur.
5 Competitive Policy Environments
We now turn our attention to competitive policy environments, where multiple individuals and
groups can simultaneously develop new high-quality proposals. Active competition between ideologically-
distinct factions on either side of a more-centrist government is the norm in most major domestic
policy issue areas, including as health care, energy, and the environment. Policy development in
regulatory rulemaking environments is also frequently characterized by competition, where busi-
ness, labor, and consumer interests propose already-developed regulations that reáect their di§erent
priorities (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987).
Analyzing the e§ects of veto players in competitive environments is signiÖcantly more complex
than in monopolistic environments for several reasons. First, even absent veto players, the deci-
sionmakerís welfare is a§ected by the preferences and abilities of the entrepreneurs in equilibrium;
a monopolist entrepreneur always exercises informal agenda-setting power, but competition forces
the entrepreneurs to leave the decisionmaker with some rents (Hirsch and Shotts 2015a). Second,
the strategic calculus faced by the entrepreneurs is much more complicated. In particular, because
investing in quality is ìall-payî (Siegel 2009), equilibria are often in mixed strategies. Thus, an
entrepreneur must sometimes pay the costs of investing in policy quality while uncertain about
which policy her competitor will develop. Finally, the impact of the veto players on the strategic
environment can be highly asymmetric. If the status quo closely reáects the preferences of both a
veto player and an aligned entrepreneur, then that entrepreneur will Önd it much harder (and less
beneÖcial) than her competitor to realize additional ideological gains through entrepreneurship.
5.1 Properties of Equilibria
We begin by describing some properties of equilibria in the competitive model that apply to the
game with both a single decisionmaker, and with veto players. The statements herein are corollaries
of Lemmas and Propositions in a more complete treatment in the Appendix. For our analysis, we
assume that the two entrepreneurs are located strictly to the left and right of the decisionmaker, and
denote their ideal points xL < 0 and xR > 0, respectively. We also henceforth assume that either
there are either no veto players (xV l = xV r = xD = 0), or that they are located strictly to the left
and right of the decisionmaker (xV l < 0 < xV r).11
Describing equilibria requires brieáy revisiting the notation of Section 3.1 and concepts from the
baseline competitive model in Hirsch and Shotts (2015a). Recall that the score s (y; q) = UD (y; q) =
q $ y2 of a policy is the utility it gives the decisionmaker, and that a policy (s; y) with score s and
ideology y (and hence quality q = s+ y2) is veto-proof if and only if y 2 [zL (s) ; zR (s)], where zL (s)
is the left boundary of the veto proof set as a function of score and zR (s) is the right boundary
(see Figure 2). While the concept of a score helpful in the monopoly model, it is essential to
equilibrium analysis in the competitive model. The reason is that competitive equilibria are often
in mixed strategies, i.e., the policies of each entrepreneur can be a probability distribution 2i over
the two-dimensional policy space.
Writing each entrepreneurís policies in terms of score and ideology (s; y) substantially simpliÖes
the analysis because the decisionmaker is equally-happy with all veto-proof policies that have the
same score s ñ i.e., that satisfy q $ y2 = s and y 2 [zL (s) ; zR (s)]. They give him the same utility if
implemented, and are all acceptable to the veto players. Consequently, from the perspective of each
entrepreneur i, all such policiesñif developedñwill be implemented with the same probability. This
probability is exactly equal to the probability that her opponent $i develops a lower score policy or
11The present draft omits analysis of a single veto player in the competitive model. However, we have analyzed
that variant, and our results suggest that the equilibrium correspondence is continuous as xV j ! xD = 0 for some
j 2 fl; rg, in which case the model with two veto players can be used to approximate a model with one veto player.
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F#i (s), where F#i (*) denotes the probability CDF over scores induced by the (potentially mixed)
strategy of iís opponent.
While veto proof policies with the same score (s; y) are all equivalent to the decisionmaker, they
crucially are not equivalent to the entrepreneurs; di§erent policies will have di§erent ideologies y,
levels of quality s+y2, and costs to develop $)i
%
s+ y2
&
. A second simplifying feature of the model,
however, is that given her opponentís score CDF, each entrepreneur has a unique optimal ideology
to target y!i (s) when she develops a policy with score s. This property arises from the fact that
an entrepreneur is more willing to pay the up-front costs of quality-development for the uncertain
beneÖts of ideological gains when the policy in question has a higher probability of being adopted
(i.e., has a higher score s). Formally, we consider equilibria of the model with veto players that have
the following property, which is established in the Appendix.12
Corollary 2 In the equilibria we consider, with probability 1 each entrepreneurís policies (si; yi) are
either 0-quality, or satisfy yi = y!i (si), where
y!i (si) =
(
F#i (si) * xi,i when it is veto proof, and
the closer of zL (si) and zR (si) to F#i (si) * xi,i otherwise
:
The ability to uniquely describe the optimal ideology for each score in a best-response is the
critical simpliÖcation that allows a characterization of equilibria. Corollary 2 is the analog to Ob-
servation 1 in the baseline competitive model without veto players in Hirsch and Shotts (2015a),
with one key di§erence. Without veto players, the optimal ideology y!i (s) for each score s is simply
the probability F#i (s) that a score-s policy wins, multiplied by the ratio xi,i of the entrepreneurís
ideology to her marginal costs. With veto players, however, this policy may not be veto-proof, i.e.,
its ideology may not be in YV (s) = [zL (s) ; zR (s)]. Consequently, the optimal ideology y!i (s) is
either F#i (s) xi,i if it is veto proof, or the closest boundary of the veto-proof set if it is not.
5.1.1 Form of Equilibria
We henceforth say that an entrepreneur is active if she develops a veto proof policy with score
> s0 (and therefore with strictly positive quality); in the terminology of score CDFs, the probability
Fi (s0) that she develops a policy with score % s0 is strictly < 1. We say that she is inactive if she
only develops a policy with score % s0; equivalently, Fi (s0) = 1.13 In the competitive model without
veto players, there is a unique equilibrium in mixed strategies (Hirsch and Shotts 2015a). With veto
players, however, equilibria may be in both pure and mixed strategies; we therefore describe the
form of each of these types of equilibria in turn.
12Showing that this property applies to all equilibria is work in progress, and requires ruling out the possibility that
both entrepreneurs develop policies with the same score with strictly positive probability.
13Note that when xV l < xD < xV r, a veto-proof policy has positive quality i.f.f. it has score > s0.
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Pure Strategy Equilibria The form of all pure strategy equilibria is described in the following
corollary to Proposition 4, which is in the Appendix.
Corollary 3 In every pure strategy equilibrium at least one entrepreneur $i is inactive, and the
other develops her monopoly policy (s!i ; y
!
i ) with probability 1.
The requirement that one entrepreneur be inactive in a pure strategy equilibrium follows imme-
diately from the all-pay nature of the contest; if both entrepreneurs were active and playing pure
strategies, then at least one could be better o§ by either developing no policy (saving the costs)
or developing a veto-proof policy that is slightly better for the decisionmaker than her opponentís
policy. The fact that an active entrepreneur in a pure strategy equilibrium develops her monopoly
policy is then obvious; in equilibrium, her incentives are identical to those of a monopolist.
Why do pure strategy equilibria sometimes exist in the presence of veto players but not in their
absence? Intuitively, the reason is that veto players sometimes force a monopolist to develop a policy
that is su¢ciently moderate and high-quality that it is insulated from potential competition.
Mixed Strategy Equilibria In mixed strategy equilibria of the model both entrepreneurs are
active and mix over both the ideological locations and qualities of the policies they develop, as
described in the following remark.
Remark 1 We consider mixed strategy equilibria in which there is an entrepreneur k and two thresh-
olds s and +s satisfying s0 % s < +s such that the following holds.
+ Absent veto players (xV l = xV r = 0), s = s0, both entrepreneursí score CDFs (Fk; F#k) are
atomless and have support [s; s].
+ With veto players (xV l < 0 < xV r), s > s0 and
ñ entrepreneur kís score CDF Fk has support [s; s] and exactly one atom at s,
ñ entrepreneur $kís score CDF F#k has support s0 [ [s; s] and exactly one atom at s0.
The mixed strategy equilibrium absent veto players is unique and relatively simple to charac-
terize analytically. With veto players, mixed strategy equilibria are cumbersome to derive by hand,
but straightforward to compute numerically from the entrepreneursí indi§erence conditions. We
characterize equilibria in which one entrepreneur k is always activeñwith probability Fk (s) she de-
velops the optimal veto-proof policy with score exactly equal to s; since s > s0 this policy has
strictly positive quality. With the remaining probability she mixes over the optimal veto-proof
policies generating scores in the interval [s; s]. Her competitor $k is inactive with strictly positive
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probabilityñwith probability F#k (s0) she develops no policy, and with the remaining probability she
mixes over optimal veto-proof policies generating scores in the same interval [s; s]. The boundary
conditions and di§erential equations characterizing the equilibria are described in the Appendix, and
arise straightforwardly from the entrepreneursí indi§erence conditions.
We now analyze how various conÖgurations of veto players a§ects competitive policymaking
environments. To focus on this question, we henceforth assume that the two entrepreneurs are
symmetrically located about the decisionmaker ($xL = xR = xE) and have identical costs of
developing quality ()L = )R = )E).
5.2 Competition With a Single Decisionmaker
In the previous section we showed that a monopolist entrepreneur facing a single decisionmaker
behaves as an informal agenda setter, extracting all the beneÖts of quality in the form of ideological
rents (as discussed in Corollary 1).
In Hirsch and Shotts (2015a), however, we show that competition prevents this from occurring;
in equilibrium, some rents from policy development must be left behind for the decisionmaker. The
reason is that an entrepreneur need only produce a higher-score policy than her competitor to get
it adopted; if her competitor attempted to behave as a monopoly agenda setter and produce a
0$score policy, she could defeat it by developing the decisionmakerís ideal policy with " quality. We
also show that the competitive model with a single decisionmaker has a unique symmetric mixed
strategy equilibrium. In the equilibrium, both entrepreneurs are always active, and mix without
atoms over an interval of strictly-positive scores. As in the monopoly case, the entrepreneurs use
quality investments to obtain ideological outcomes that they prefer. In contrast, however, the amount
of quality that an entrepreneur develops on any given policy exceeds the minimum required to gain
the decisionmakerís support over the status quo; the reason is simply that each entrepreneur need
also gain the decisionmakerís support over her competitor. The equilibrium is stated below, which
is a restatement of Propositions 1-2 and Corollary 1 in Hirsch and Shotts (2015a).
Corollary 4 Suppose that $xL = xR = xE, )L = )R = )E ; and there is a single decisionmaker.
Then there is a unique mixed strategy equilibrium in which the entrepreneurs mix smoothly over
policies with ideology and quality
%
yi; s (jyij) + y2i
&
, and in which
1. the ideological extremism jyij of each entrepreneurís policies is uniformly distributed over [0, xE,E ]
2. the score of a policy with ideology yi is s! (jyij) = 4xE
#
xE ln
#
xE
xE#jyij
$
$ jyij
$
> 0 for jyij > 0
In addition, as the entrepreneurs become more extreme (higher xE) or more skilled (lower )E), their
proposals become Örst-order stochastically more extreme, but also Örst-order stochastically higher
quality and better for the decisionmaker.
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The unique equilibrium is depicted in Figure 7. The left panel depicts the entrepreneursí score
CDFs FL(s) = FR(s) = F (s), which are atomless and identical (since the distribution over ideo-
logical extremism, and the mapping from ideological extremism to score, is identical). The right
panel depicts the ideological locations and quality of policies, ranging from a 0-quality policy at the
decisionmakerís ideal point to a high-quality policy with ideology jyij =
/// xE,E ///. The decisionmakerís
utility is strictly positive for all equilibrium policies, and therefore exceeds her utility in the monopoly
game when she is a single decisionmaker.
A key implication of Corollary 4 is that the decisionmakerís equilibrium utility exceeds her
utility from the status quo (both in expectation and with probability 1) even absent veto players;
competition partially protects her from monopoly agenda setting. In addition, her utility is increasing
in both the ideological extremity of the entrepreneurs xE , and their common skill at developing
quality )#1E . These properties are discussed in greater depth in Hirsch and Shotts (2015a). Here
it su¢ces to note that greater ideological extremism xE and lower costs )E of developing quality
increase the entrepreneursí potential rents from entrepreneurship; a monopolist would keep all these
rents, whereas with competition the decisionmaker captures a proportionate share of them.
5.3 Competition With Veto Players
We now analyze the e§ects of veto players when there are two competing entrepreneurs, and compare
our results to the competitive game without veto players, and also to the monopoly game with veto
players. The results in this section are computational, in the sense that we derive analytical su¢cient
conditions for equilibrium in the Appendix to compute equilibria and perform comparative statics.
The distinction between analytical and computational results is indicated with the label ëResultí
in lieu of ëProposition.í We note that our analytical results do not rule out multiple equilibria.
However, our computational procedure can check that there is a unique solution to our equilibrium
conditions, and every one of the wide range of cases that we have computed (i.e., beyond the
symmetric parameter proÖles presented here) has a unique equilibrium.14 To focus on the pure
e§ect of dispersion of authority, here we consider a model in which veto players are symmetric,
xV r = $xV l = xV ; and the entrepreneurs have common costs, )L = )R = )E :
5.3.1 Equilibrium Strategies
In the competitive model with two symmetric veto players, one entrepreneur is always located farther
from the status quo y0 and is therefore worse o§ under it; we henceforth refer to her as the dissatisÖed
14The equilibrium in the game absent veto players is also shown analytically to be unique in Hirsch and Shotts
(2015). We furthermore conjecture, and have partially proved, that our su¢cient conditions for equilibrium with veto
players are also necessary; combined with our computational results this would strongly suggest uniqueness.
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entrepreneur. Correspondingly, we refer to her counterpart as the satisÖed entrepreneur.
The dissatisÖed entrepreneur has two important features that distinguish her from the satisÖed
entrepreneur. First, because loss functions along the ideology dimension are common and convex,
she places a greater marginal value on ideological shifts in her direction from the status quo; she is
thus more motivated to engage in entrepreneurship than her competitor. Second, she faces an easier
time persuading the binding veto player to consent to policy changesñfor example, if the status quo
is y0 < 0, then it is easier to convince the left veto player to move policy to the right than it is to
convince the right veto player to move policy to the left.
We begin by describing basic properties of the computed equilibria.
Result 1 In the equilibrium with symmetric entrepreneurs $xL = xR = xE and symmetric veto
players $xV l = xV r = xV who are more moderate than the entrepreneurs (xV < xE),
1. the dissatisÖed entrepreneur is always active, while the satisÖed entrepreneur is sometimes or
always inactive
2. the dissatisÖed entrepreneurís score CDF Örst order stochastically dominates the satisÖed en-
trepreneurís score CDF
Figure 8 presents an example of a typical mixed strategy equilibrium for the game; the left panel
depicts equilibrium score CDFs, while the right panel depicts equilibrium policies. The dissatisÖed
entrepreneur (located to the right of the decisionmaker) is always active by virtue of her greater
motivation to change the status quo and her greater opportunity to do so because y0 is closer to the
ideal point of the left veto player. With strictly positive probability, she develops a policy located
at the blue dot in the right panel; with the remaining probability, she mixes over the policies on the
blue curve. The policies that she develops are fully constrained by the veto players, i.e., they are on
the boundary of the veto proof set, due to her greater distance from the status quo. The satisÖed
entrepreneur on the left, in contrast, is sometimes inactive, as indicated by the purple dot at the
status quo. With the remaining probability she mixes over the policies on the purple curve, and her
policies (in equilibrium) are unconstrained by the veto players.
As depicted in the left panel, the score CDF of the dissatisÖed entrepreneur Örst order stochas-
tically dominates that of the satisÖed entrepreneur. Intuitively, the pattern of policy competition
is one in which the dissatisÖed side of a policy issue is both more likely to develop a new proposal,
and more likely to have the proposal she develops ultimately adopted. In the symmetric competi-
tive model absent veto players, the unique equilibrium is symmetric. However, veto players alone
combined with otherwise symmetric entrepreneurs result in asymmetries, because the gridlock they
induce tilts the initial playing Öeld against one side of a policy issue.
20
5.3.2 The Pattern of Competition
As previously observed, the satisÖed entrepreneur is inactive with strictly positive probability. We
now consider how the satisÖed entrepreneurís probability of being active is a§ected by the extremity
of the veto players xV and the location of the status quo y0.
Result 2 The probability that the satisÖed entrepreneur is active is strictly decreasing in the ideo-
logical the extremity of the status quo jy0j and the veto players xV , unless the equilibrium is in pure
strategies, in which case it is constant at 0.
The probability that the satisÖed entrepreneur is active is depicted as a contour plot in Figure
9 as a function of the location of the status quo y0 (on the x-axis) and the extremity of the veto
players (on the y-axis). In the mixed strategy region, the probability is strictly decreasing in both
quantities; and for su¢ciently extreme veto players the equilibrium converges to a pure strategy
region where the satisÖed entrepreneur never develops a policy, and the dissatisÖed entrepreneur
appears to act as a monopolist.
These comparative statics arise because of the asymmetric impact of veto players on the entre-
preneurs. Veto players essentially force the dissatisÖed entrepreneur to make additional ideological
concessions and investments in quality, which also has the (strategically unintended) e§ect of forti-
fying her policy against competition. This is easiest to see by considering the e§ect of a more distant
status quo y0 on a monopolist entrepreneurís policy proposal. By Proposition 1, a monopolistís
policy becomes increasingly high quality (but ideologically Öxed) as the status quo moves away from
her and toward a counterbalancing veto player, because the veto player demands ever-increasing
quality investments to consent to the same ideological outcome. These investments simultaneously
make it more di¢cult ñ and less intrinsically beneÖcial ñ for a competing entrepreneur to enter the
arena with her own alternative.
Overall, in the presence of veto players, actual direct competition is most likely to occur in
equilibrium when veto players and status quo points are moderate. The reason is similar to standard
contest models; observable competition (in equilibrium) is a function of parity of motivation and
ability. Also worth noting is that the lack of parity in the results we present here is not driven by
asymmetries in ideologies and costs, but rather by asymmetries in the status quo, and the resulting
asymmetric impact of institutional barriers to change.
5.3.3 Decisionmaker Utility
Finally, we consider when the decisionmaker would be better o§ eliminating the veto players and
placing all decisionmaking authority in his own hands. Recall that in monopolistic policy environ-
ments, the decisionmaker is better o§ eliminating the veto players when the status quo is su¢ciently
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close to the monopolist entrepreneur. Competitive environments are di§erent, however, both because
of the disparate impact of veto players, and because competition already gives the decisionmaker
some rents from policy development. The following result characterizes when the decisionmaker
would be better o§ eliminating the veto players in a competitive policy environment.
Result 3 In competitive policy environments with symmetric veto players and entrepreneurs, the
decisionmaker is better o§ eliminating the veto players if
+ they are su¢ciently moderate (xV < +xV )
+ they are more extreme (xV > +xV ) but the status quo is su¢ciently moderate (jy0j < +y0 (xV )).
The two panels of Figure 10 illustrate when the decisionmaker would be better o§ eliminating
symmetric veto players as a function of the location of the status quo y0 (on the x-axis) and the
extremity of the veto players (on the y-axis). In both panels, the red region indicates where the
decisionmaker is better o§ eliminating the veto players, while the green region indicates where he is
better o§ maintaining them. The Örst panel depicts a monopolistic policy environment with a single
entrepreneur on the right (as described in Proposition 3); the second panel depicts a competitive
policy environment with entrepreneurs located symmetrically on either side of the decisionmaker.15
A number of results emerge. First and as previously described, in a monopolistic policy environ-
ment the decisionmaker is better o§ eliminating the veto players when the status quo is su¢ciently
close to the monopolist, because the entrepreneur and the aligned veto player can jointly protect it
rather than engage in entrepreneurship. This includes cases where the status quo is extreme but on
the same side of the decisionmaker as the entrepreneur.
The pattern is distinctly di§erent in a competitive policy environment. The presence of entrepre-
neurs on either side of the decisionmaker means that an extreme status quo can never be protected;
one faction will always have a strong interest in engaging in entrepreneurship to change it. With
competition, the decisionmaker instead beneÖts from eliminating the veto players when the status
quo is moderate, and located roughly in between the left and right entrepreneurs.
Thus, in a competitive policy environment the inclusion of veto players beneÖts the decisionmaker
precisely when they have extreme preferences, and seek to protect an extreme status quo. This result
seems counterintuitive, until one considers how extreme veto players a§ect the strategic behavior of
other political actors; namely the entrepreneurs.
The entrepreneurs are most willing to invest in quality to realize ideological gains when they
are highly motivated to change the status quo, i.e., when it is distant from them. Under these
circumstances, an extreme veto player is beneÖcial to the decisionmaker because he can extract
15As is the case throughout this section, the entrepreneurs are assumed to be of high ability
!
+E < 1 +
xE
xV
"
.
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greater quality investments and ideological concessions than the decisionmaker herself could cred-
ibly demand. When the status quo is moderate to begin with, neither entrepreneur is su¢ciently
motivated for these beneÖcial e§ects to emerge. Instead, the veto playersí collective resistance to
change simply dampens the intensity of policy competition. The decisionmaker is consequently
better o§ eliminating them, and relying on competition alone to spur policy development.
Combining the preceding results with our results on the pattern of competition yields an ad-
ditional and surprising implication. In competitive political environments with veto players, the
presence of observable competition and the welfare of the decisionmaker are inversely correlated.
When the status quo is moderate, the entrepreneursí motivation to change it is comparable but low;
both are observed to be active, but they invest less in quality. When the status quo is extreme,
the entrepreneursí motivation to change it is highly asymmetric, and a counterbalancing veto player
extracts substantial ideological concessions and quality investments from the dissatisÖed entrepre-
neur. The decisionmaker is better o§ by virtue of these investments, but little direct competition is
observed.
The conclusion we draw is that in competitive political environments with veto players, the ab-
sence of direct competition and apparent monopoly by one interest group is not necessarily indicative
of dysfunctional politics. Instead, it may be indicative of an extreme status quo on a policy issue that
only a interest group is highly motivated to change. Under these conditions, the veto players already
extract substantial quality investments. Consequently, potential competing groups may rationally
calculate that they are best o§ remaining inactive because their interests are already protected. We
return to this interpretation of the competitive model in the subsequent section.
6 Application: Filibusters
We now show how our model can be applied to understand the stability of the U.S. Senateís 60-vote
supermajority requirement for cloture to break a Ölibuster. As documented by Binder and Smith
(1997), has there never been a Senate majority in support of eliminating the Ölibuster on legislation
by reducing the cloture requirement to 51 votes.16 This presents a puzzle for a variety of reasons.
First, the Ölibuster is often vigorously denounced for hindering majoritiesí preferred legislation.
Second, constitutional scholarship and Senate history support the proposition that a simple majority
may, through various procedures, eliminate or modify the Ölibuster (Gold and Gupta 2005).
Finally, and most importantly, in simple spatial models of policymaking, supermajority rules
generally harm centrists by preventing them from altering policies to reáect their own ideal point.
While supermajority requirements can be rationalized as an optimal institutional response by cen-
16Note, however, that the Senate has recently established a precedent for majority-cloture on most conÖrmations
of executive appointees.
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trists to counterbalance the power of non-centrists who have formal agenda-setting power (Peress
2009), it is unclear whether such arguments are applicable to the U.S. Senate. In the Senate, the
absence of germaneness requirements gives individual members considerable power to ensure that
their proposals are included on the agenda. Indeed, party leaders in the Senate expend extraordinary
e§ort to accommodate the scheduling demands of individual members (Oleszek 2011).
Our model, however, shows that even in the absence of formal agenda setting power, centrist
Senators may beneÖt from maintaining supermajority requirements that create de facto veto players.
In particular, our model with a single decisionmaker is akin to a legislature operating under majority
rule as it considers policy proposals generated by interest groups, committees, or party leaders. The
ideal point of the e§ective decisionmaker is that of the median legislator. Our model with veto players
can be straightforwardly interpreted in a manner consistent with the standard pivotal politics model
(Brady and Volden 1998, Krehbiel 1998). Because passing legislation requires the support of 60 of
100 senators, the 40th and 60th most liberal senators e§ectively act as veto players (with the support
of more-extreme members).
As we have shown in the previous sections, a centrist decisionmaker in a political organization
often beneÖts when non-centrist actors have veto power. In the context of the Senate, this implies
that the median Senator can often beneÖt from the threat of a Ölibuster if it forces policy entre-
preneurs to generate higher-quality legislation. Moreover, our analysis implies the beneÖts of the
Ölibuster institution can be greatest when circumstances have resulted in non-centrist status quo
policies. This could occur in policy areas that are rapidly changing, such as Önancial regulation or
health care.
More subtly, as suggested in the previous section, our analysis implies that visible activity by
highly motivated partisan entrepreneurs (e.g., the liberal wing of the Democratic party on health
care reform in 2009), the presence of non-centrist veto players that counteract the entrepreneurs (e.g.,
Senator Ben Nelson of Nebraska), and the absence of credible alternative proposals by the opposition
(in this instance, the Republican party) may not indicate a policymaking environment that harms
centrists. Rather, such features may result when there is a highly-motivated entrepreneur willing to
expend considerable e§ort to change the status quo, whose motivation drives out potential competing
policy entrepreneurs, and who is forced by veto players to generate a higher-quality proposal than
she otherwise would, thereby beneÖtting centrists.
Finally, we note that the literature o§ers many explanations in the literature for the stability of
the Ölibuster and supermajority rules more generally. Thus, our model constitutes only one of many
possible rationales. However, we note that most competing explanations that lack formal agenda
setters focus on either dynamic policymaking considerations (e.g. Alesina and Tabellini 1990) or
ex-ante preference uncertainty (e.g. Aghion, Alesina and Trebbi 2004). Our analysis, in contrast,
illustrates how and when such rules may beneÖt centrists even in a static, complete information
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policymaking environment by inducing the development of higher-quality legislation.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we developed a model of costly production of policy proposals in political environments
where actors have divergent objectives, but also have a shared interest in the quality of policies that
are enacted. In such environments, policy entrepreneurs have opportunities to obtain informal
agenda power by crafting policies that are well-designed but that also promote their own objectives.
Our primary goal in the paper has been to assess how the presence of veto players a§ects the nature
of policies that are enacted as well as the utility of decisionmakers.
If there a single entrepreneur with a monopoly on the ability to create high-quality policies,
the e§ect of veto players depends critically on three factors: the location of the veto players, the
location of the status quo, and how e§ective the entrepreneur is at producing high-quality policies.
We show that a decisionmaker can be hurt by the presence of veto players, either because they
lead to gridlock (as in standard pivotal politics models) or because the equilibrium policy outcomes
are only marginally better than the status quo. However, the decisionmaker can also be helped
by veto players, when they force the entrepreneur to develop high-quality policies that are not too
ideologically-divergent from the decisionmakerís preferred outcomes. We show that the decision-
maker beneÖts most when a veto player counterbalances the entrepreneur, the status quo is far
from the entrepreneurís ideal point, and the entrepreneur faces low costs of developing high-quality
policies.
Several of the results from the single-entrepreneur model continue to hold if there are two entre-
preneurs on either side of the decisionmaker. Absent veto players, competing entrepreneurs in an
all-pay contest will generate policies that beneÖt the decisionmaker. If the status quo policy is quite
moderate, the e§ect of veto players symmetrically located on either side of the decisionmaker is to
dampen this competition, thereby making the decisionmaker worse o§. However, if the status quo
is su¢ciently noncentrist, it will be far away from one of the entrepreneurs, who will be motivated
to work hard to create a high-quality policy, while the other entrepreneur remains inactive.
One surprising implication of our analysis is that veto players are most beneÖcial for a centrist
decisionmaker in precisely the circumstances where standard pivotal politics models predict that
they are most harmful, speciÖcally when the status quo is close to the ideal point of a veto player
who has preferences substantially di§erent from those of the decisionmaker. In such circumstances,
the only faction that will actively develop new policy alternatives is the one that is highly dissatisÖed
with the status quo. However, the lack of observable competition is simply a symptom of the fact
that veto players are forcing the policy developer to craft reasonably-moderate, high quality policies.
Our model thus contrasts sharply with simple spatial models of policy choice by providing a
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quality-based rationale for fragmented decisionmaking authority. This may potentially explain the
stability of supermajority requirements in the U.S. Senate and other political institutions that could
choose to operate under purely majoritarian procedures yet choose instead to maintain implicit veto
rights for noncentrist members.
The model also yields testable comparative statics on the number of well-developed policy pro-
posals that will be created for a given issue: multiple serious proposals are likely to be developed
when the status quo is centrist or when veto players are absent. Moreover, our model provides
predictions about the quality of policies that are adopted. Quality is di¢cult to measure empirically
because it comes from a variety of characteristics. However, if measurement issues can be overcome
one could test the modelís prediction that centrist policies that are enacted tend to be of mediocre
quality, whereas noncentrist ones typically are carefully-crafted, because of the need to gain veto
playersí approval.
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Appendix
In Appendix A we prove results of the monopoly model. In Appendix B we present a general
treatment of the competitive model and provide proofs for the statements contained therein.
A Monopoly Model
Proof of Proposition 1
Without loss of generality, we consider the case xbV E % 0 < xE : We prove the proposition in
three steps.
Step 1. We show that the entrepreneur either declines to develop a policy or develops one on
the boundary of the veto proof set between the entrepreneur and the status quo, i.e., yE 2 [y0; xE ]
with qE such that yE = zR (s). Note that the entrepreneur never develops a policy with qE > 0
that is outside the veto proof set, because doing so means incurring cost )EqE and receiving no
beneÖt. Also, note that within the veto-proof set, only policies with yE 2 fzL (s) ; zR (s)g ; can be
optimal to develop. If yE 2 (zL (s) ; zR (s)) ; then for su¢ciently small 7 the entrepreneur can develop
(yE ; qE $ 7), which will be enacted and yield ()E $ 1) 7 higher utility for the entrepreneur. Finally,
note that if the entrepreneurís policy is veto-proof and yE < y0 then the entrepreneur is strictly
better o§ developing (y0; qE) and if yE > xE then the entrepreneur is strictly better o§ developing
(xE ; qE). For yE 2 [y0; xE ] the binding veto player is to the left of y0 so yE = zR (s) :
Step 2. We Önd the entrepreneurís utility from developing yE 2 [y0; xE ] with qE such that
yE = zR (s) : For such a policy, indi§erence of the left veto player means qE = (yE $ xbV E)2 $
(y0 $ xbV E)2 = 2xbV E (y0 $ yE) + y2E $ y20, so the entrepreneurís utility is
$ (xE $ yE)2 $ ()E $ 1)
!
2xbV E (y0 $ yE) + y2E $ y20
"
:
Taking the derivative with respect to yE yields
2xE $ 2yE $ ()E $ 1) ($2xbV E + 2yE)
which equals zero at
y^!E =
1
)E
xE +
'
1$ 1
)E
(
xbV E :
For y0 < y^!E ; this weighted midpoint is optimal, whereas for y0 > y^
!
E the entrepreneurís utility is
strictly higher from sitting out than it is for developing any yE 2 (y0; xE ] on the boundary of the
veto proof set.
Step 3. The decisionmakerís utility is$ (y!E)2+2xbV E (y0 $ y!E)+(y!E)2$y20 = s0+2 jxbV E(y!E $ y0)j
and quality q!E follows directly from the deÖnition of score.!
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Proof of Proposition 2(i)
xV < xE implies that y0 < xE (since y0 2 [0; xV ]), so the binding veto player is the decisionmaker
since the entrepreneur wishes to move policy rightward. By Proposition 1, s!E = $y20 < 0, so the
decisionmaker is better o§ eliminating the veto player. Absent the veto player, the policy outcome is'
xE
,E
;
#
xE
,E
$2(
. With the veto player, if y0 <
xE
,E
the policy outcome is
'
xE
,E
;$y20 +
#
xE
,E
$2(
; which
is equally extreme and lower quality than in the absence of the veto player. With the veto player, if
y0 >
xE
,E
the policy outcome is (y0; 0) ; which is more extreme and lower quality than in the absence
of the veto player. This shows the desired properties.!
Proof of Propositions 2(ii) and 3
Given a status quo y0 < xE and a binding veto player to the left of the decisionmaker of ideological
extremity jxV j, the decisionmakerís equilibrium utility is s!E = $y20 + 2 jxV j * (y^!E $ y0) for y0 < y^!E
and $y20 otherwise. It is simple to verify that this is decreasing in y0 so it has a well deÖned root.
Using the quadratic formula, s!E & 0 i.f.f.
y0 % +y0 = jxV j *
 s'
2
'
1 +
xE
jxV j
(
* )#1E $ 1
(
$ 1
!
To prove the results for a single counterbalancing veto player, observe that in this case the status
quo is y0 2 [xV ; 0]. Thus,
+ For the entrepreneur to be better o§ maintaining the veto player regardless of the location of
the status quo with a single counterbalancing entrepreneur requires that +y0 > 0, since then
all feasible status quos y0 2 [xV ; 0] are < +y0. It is simple to verify that this is the case when
)E < 1 +
xE
jxV j .
+ For the entrepreneur to be better o§ eliminating the veto player regardless of the location of
the status quo with a single counterbalancing entrepreneur requires that +y0 < xV , since then
all feasible status quos y0 2 [xV ; 0] are > +y0. It is simple to verify that this is the case when
)E > 2
#
1 + xEjxV j
$
.
+ For the entrepreneurís welfare to be based on the location of the status quo with a single
counterbalancing entrepreneur requires that +y0 2 [xV ; 0], and it is simple to verify that this is
the case when the entrepreneur has intermediate costs )E 2
#
1 + xEjxV j ; 2
#
1 + xEjxV j
$$
.
To prove the results for symmetric veto players, observe that this implies the status quo may be
anywhere in y0 2 [$xV ; xV ] which is < xE . The condition to be better o§ eliminating the veto player
for all status quos is identical, i.e., +y0 < $xV . The condition for the decisionmaker to be better o§
maintaining the veto player for all status quos is now that +y0 > xV since y0 2 [$xV ; xV ], and it is
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simple to verify that this holds for very low costs )E < 25
#
1 + xExV
$
. Otherwise +y0 2 [$xV ; xV ] and
whether the decisionmaker beneÖts from eliminating the veto players is based on the location of the
status quo.!
B Competitive Model
For analysis of the competitive model we assume that the leftmost and rightmost veto players are
distinct from the decisionmaker (xV l < 0 and xV r > 0 ), which simpliÖes the notation and equilibrium
analysis. Our computational results also suggest that the equilibrium when xV i ! xD = 0 converges
to the equilibrium when xV i = 0, and hence that this assumption is innocuous.
Recall from the main text that the score of a policy (y; q) is the utility UD (y; q) = q $ y2 that
it gives the decisionmaker, and that player iís utility for a policy with score s and ideology y is
Vi (s; y) = Ui
%
y; s+ y2
&
= $x2i + s + 2xiy. We show below that for an entrepreneur who wants to
move policy to the left, xV r is binding, whereas for an entrepreneur who wants to move policy to
the right, xV l is binding.
We transform strategies (y; q) to be expressed in terms of score and ideology. An entrepreneurís
pure strategy bi = (si; yi) is a two-dimensional element of B 0
0
(s; y) 2 R2 j s+ y2 & 01, or the set
of scores and ideologies that imply positive-quality policies. A mixed strategy 2i is a probability
measure over the Borel subsets of B.
B.1 Equilibrium outcomes of policymaking subgame
We Örst characterize equilibrium outcomes of the subgame commencing with the decisionmakerís
proposal, which is subject to the approval of the veto players. Recall that the status quo b0 = (y0; q0)
is assumed to have quality q0 = 0 and therefore score s0 = $y20 and ideology y0 2 [xV l; xV r]
between the leftmost and rightmost veto players. The history consists of the proÖle of proposals
b 2 B# B made by the entrepreneurs. Any proÖle of strategies results in a probability distribution
w (b) : B2 ! 0(b [ b0) over policy outcomes for each history b 2 B# B. The policy outcome must
be one of the entrepreneursí policies or the status quo b0.
When the decisionmaker proposes some policy (s; y), the veto players will evaluate that policy
against the status quo (s0; y0). Player iís utility di§erence between the two policies is
Vi (s; y)$ Vi (s0; y0) = (s$ s0) + 2xi (y $ y0) ;
which satisÖes a single crossing property in xi. Hence, if y < y0, then a necessary and su¢cient
condition for all veto players to weakly prefer the proposal to the status quo is that the rightmost veto
player xV r weakly prefers it, i.e., VV r (s; y)$VV r (s0; y0) & 0 () y & y0$ s#s02jxV rj = zL (s). Similarly,
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if y > y0 then a necessary and su¢cient condition for all veto players to weakly prefer the proposal
to the status quo is that the leftmost veto player xV l weakly prefers it, i.e., VV l (s; y)$VV l (s0; y0) &
0 () y % y0 + s#s02jxV lj = zR (s). Thus, as stated in DeÖnition 1 a policy is weakly preferred by all
veto players to the status quo if and only if s & s0 and y 2 YV (s) = [zL (s) ; zR (s)]; we term this
the veto proof set.
In the policymaking stage, the decisionmaker is an agenda-setter vis-a-vis the veto players. As
is customary in agenda-setting models, we henceforth restrict attention to strategy proÖles in which
both veto players break indi§erence in favor of the decisionmakerís proposal. With this restriction,
the organization must always choose a policy (s; y) that maximizes the score (i.e. decisionmakerís
utility) from within the subset of feasible policies b [ b0 in the veto-proof set YV . A policy outside
the veto proof set can never prevail because it will be vetoed by one of the veto players. The
decisionmaker will never propose a policy from within the set that doesnít maximize her utility,
because any other proposal within the set will be accepted for sure. A formal statement of policy
outcomes given each history is as follows.
Observation 1 When the veto players break indi§erence in favor of the decisionmakerís proposal,
a probability distribution over outcomes w (b) can result from an equilibrium of the subgame com-
mencing with b if and only if 8b in the support of w (b), (s; y) 2 argmax
fb[b0g\f(s;y):s(s0;y2YV (s)g
s.
B.2 Equilibrium Conditions
We now derive equilibrium conditions. In the baseline model in Hirsch and Shotts (2015a), Fi (s) is
deÖned to be the CDF over scores induced by iís mixed strategy 2i. The presence of veto players,
however, requires slightly adjusting this deÖnition; if the decisionmaker proposes a policy with score
s > s0 that isnít veto proof, it will be vetoed, the outcome will be the status quo b0, and player iís
resulting utility from policy will be Vi(s0; y0).
To accommodate this wrinkle, let Fi (s) instead denote the CDF over the decisionmakerís utility
if he were to always propose entrepreneur iís policy (si; yi) (which is distributed according to 2i ).
That is, Fi denotes the CDF of the random variable 1yi2YV (si) * si +
%
1$ 1yi2YV (s)
& * s0. Thus, if i
only develops veto-proof policies, then as in Hirsch and Shotts (2015a) Fi is just the CDF over scores
induced by iís mixed strategy 2i. (In the equilibria we consider the distinction will be immaterial,
since the entrepreneurs will only develop veto-proof policies). As in the original model, we restrict
attention to strategies generating score CDFs that can be written as the sum of an absolutely
continuous and a discrete distribution.
Let 6i (si; yi;2#i) denote iís expected utility from developing policy (si; yi) (suppressing possible
dependence on how the decisionmaker chooses between two bills that o§er her the exact same score).
Note that our simplifying assumption that xV l < 0 < xV r implies that (i) no policy with score s < s0
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is veto proof, (ii) the unique veto proof policy with score = s0 is the status quo (s0; y0), and (iii) the
unique 0-quality policy that is veto proof is the status quo (s0; y0).
We Örst consider scores si > s0 at which $iís score CDF has no atom. For any veto proof policy
(yi 2 [zL (si) ; zR (si)]), we have that 6i (si; yi;2#i) is equal to
$)i
%
si + y
2
i
&
+ F#i (si) * Vi (si; yi) +
Z
s!i>si;y!i2YV (s)
Vi (s#i; y#i) d2#i: (1)
With probability F#i (si) ; iís opponent develops a policy that is either not veto proof or is veto
proof and has a lower score, iís policy in this case will then be proposed and passed for sure, and
this yields utility Vi (si; yi). With the remaining probability (when s#i > si and y#i 2 YV (s)), $iís
policy will be proposed and passed for sure, yielding utility Vi (s#i; y#i). Now observe that only the
Örst two terms of equation 1 are a§ected by yi as long as it is veto-proof. Taking the Örst derivative
w.r.t. yi yields $2)iyi+2F#i (si)xi, which is strictly decreasing in yi. There is thus a unique strictly
optimal value of yi in the bounded interval [zL (si) ; zR (si)].
Next consider the unique veto proof policy with score s0, or any non-veto proof policy. For all
such policies, 6i (si; yi;2#i) is equal to
$)i
%
si + y
2
i
&
+ F#i (s0) * Vi (s0; y0) +
Z
s!i>s0;y!i2YV (s)
Vi (s#i; y#i) d2#i: (2)
With probability F#i (s0), $i develops a policy that is not veto proof or the status quo; the best
(and possibly only) choice for the DM is hence the status quo. Otherwise (when s#i > si and
y#i 2 YV (s)), $iís policy is both veto proof and strictly better than any other alternative, and is
hence chosen for sure. Now observe that the second and third terms are una§ected by (si; yi)ñthat
is, when a non-veto proof policy is developed, outcomes are as if the status quo was developed. The
only ináuence of (si; yi) is therefore through the up-front cost $)i
%
si + y
2
i
&
.
The preceding observations about 6i (si; yi;2#i) immediately yield our Örst key lemma.
Lemma 1 In the competitive model with xV l < 0 and xV r > 0,
+ developing a policy (si; yi) that is not veto proof (yi 62 YV (si)) is weakly dominated by developing
the status quo (s0; y0), and strictly dominated if it has positive quality
%
si + y
2
i > 0
&
.
+ At any score si > s0 where $iís score CDF F#i opponent has no atom, developing (si; y!i (si))
is strictly better than developing any other veto proof policy, where
y!i (si) =
(
F#i (si) * xi,i when it is veto proof, and
the closer of zL (si) and zR (si) to F#i (si) * xi,i otherwise
:
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Lemma 1 does two important things. First, it rules out an incentive to develop policies that are not
veto proof ñ this is straightforward because such a policy will lose the contest for sure if proposed.
Second, for almost every score si; it characterizes entrepreneur iís unique best ìmixtureî of ideology
yi and quality qi to produce a veto proof policy with score si:
B.2.1 Pure Strategy Equilibria
In the absence of veto players, pure strategy equilibria do not exist (Hirsch and Shotts 2015a).
However, the presence of veto players potentially introduces such equilibria. As described in the
main text, in any pure strategy equilibrium at least one entrepreneur $k must be inactive, while
the other must develop her monopoly policy (s!k; y
!
k). This will be an equilibrium when entrepreneur
$k is unwilling to pay the cost of defeating (s!k; y!k). Below we state the formal condition, using
the notation y!i (si;F#i (si)) to refer to iís optimal score ideology to develop at score si given the
probability F#i (si) that her opponent develops a lower-score policy.
Proposition 4 In every pure strategy equilibrium at least one entrepreneur $k must be inactive,
and the other must develop policy (s!k; y
!
k). Let s^ = max
0
s!k; s
!
#k
1
. There exists a pure strategy
equilibrium in which entrepreneur $k is inactive i.f.f.
(s^$ s!k) + 2x#k
%
y!#k (s^; 1)$ y!k
& % )#k #s^+ !y!#k (s^; 1)"2$
In the equilibrium, F#k (s0) = 1 and Fk (s) = 0 for sk < s!k and 1 otherwise.
Proof of Proposition 4
As argued in the main text, at least one entrepreneur must be inactive in any pure strategy equi-
librium. If $k is inactive, then k develops her equilibrium policy (s!k; y!k) from the one entrepreneur
game. This generates a utility for $k producing a policy (s#k; y#k) with s#k 6= s!k of,
$)#k
%
s#k + y2#k
&
+ 1s!k(s"k * V#k (s#k; y#k) +
#
1$ 1s!k(s"k
$
* V#k (s!k; y!k)
Scores s#k 2 (s0; s!k) are strictly dominated since they are costly and lose for sure. Scores s#k > s!k
generate identical utility as the one entrepreneur game, and$kís utility di§erence between developing
the best policy y!#k (s#k; 1) for such a score and staying out of the contest is
(s#k $ s!k) + 2x#k
%
y!#k (s#k; 1)$ y!k
&$ )#k #s#k + !y!#k (s#k; 1)"2$ (3)
From our analysis of the 1-entrepreneur game we know that when s!#k > s0, the derivative of the
objective function is > 0 for s#k < s!#k, is = 0 for s#k = s
!
#k, and is < 0 for s#k > s
!
#k. If s
!
#k = s0
then the derivative is < 0 everywhere.
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Thus, if s!#k > s
!
k then it is the strictly best score for $k conditional on producing a winning
score > s!k. Entrepreneur $k then prefers to enter the contest and the pure strategy equilibrium
does not exist if Equation (3) > 0 with s!#k substituted in. This is the condition in the statement.
If s!#k % s!k then utility and Equation (3) are both decreasing over s#k > s!k. Thus, if Equation
(3) % 0 with s!k substituted in, the equilibrium holds. Alternatively, if Equation (3) > 0 with s!k
substituted in, then $k can achieve a gain arbitrarily close to it by developing a policy with score
s!k + " for su¢ciently small "; and the pure strategy equilibrium fails. !
B.2.2 Mixed Strategy Equilibria
In mixed strategy equilibria of the model, both entrepreneurs are active with strictly positive prob-
ability, and mix over both the ideological locations and qualities of the policies they develop. In
Hirsch and Shotts (2015a) without veto players, we not only derive mixed strategy equilibria, but
also show that they are unique. In the present draft we instead present su¢cient conditions for
mixed strategy equilibria, and omit claims of existence or uniqueness. However, we conjecture that
both claims are e§ectively true, and they are work in progress for a future draft.
To state su¢cient conditions for mixed strategy equilibria, we Örst introduce additional notation.
The strategy proÖles we will consider for the statement have the following two properties: (i) with
probability 1 both entrepreneurs develop veto-proof policies of the form (si; y!i (si)), and (ii) the
probability that both entrepreneurs develop veto-proof policies with the same score s > s0 is 0; that
is, there are no ìscore ties.î Thus, in such proÖles player iís expected utility from developing any
veto-proof policy (si; yi) can be written more precisely as,
6!i (si; yi;F ) = $)i
%
si + y
2
i
&
+ F#i (si) * Vi (si; yi) +
Z
si
1
Vi
%
s#i; y!#i (s#i)
&
dF#i (4)
In addition, her utility from developing the strictly best veto-proof policy with score si is6!i (si; y
!
i (si) ;F ),
which we henceforth denote as simply 6!i (si;F ). For the proposition, we use the notation xbV k to
represent the binding veto player opposite entrepreneur k, i.e., xV l for the entrepreneur at xR and
xV r for the entrepreneur at xL. And, as before s!i is the score of entrepreneur iís optimal proposal
if she were a monopolist. We now characterize su¢cient conditions for equilibrium.
Proposition 5 A proÖle of strategies 2 is a SPNE if there is an entrepreneur k and two thresholds
s and +s satisfying s0 < s < s!k % max
0
s!#k; s
!
k
1
< +s such that the following holds.
(Policies) With probability 1, both entrepreneurs i 2 fL;Rg develop veto-proof policies of the form
(si; y
!
i (si)).
(Scores) The equilibrium score CDFs (Fk; F#k) satisfy the following conditions.
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1. Entrepreneur k is always active, Fk has support [s; s] with exactly one atom at s, and
Fk (s) = )#k
 
s+
!
y!#k (s)
"2
2x#k
%
y!#k (s;Fk (s))$ zk (s)
&! () 6!#k (s0;F ) = 6!#k (s;F )
2. Entrepreneur $k is sometimes active, F#k has support s0 [ [s; s] with exactly one atom at s0,
and
F#k (s) = )k
jxbV kj+ 2 jzk (s)j
jxbV kj+ 2 jxkj ()
@
@sk
(6!k (sk;F ))
////
s
= 0
3. For s 2 [s; s] ; the following coupled system of di§erential equations hold:
)i $ F#i (s) = f#i (s) * 2xi
%
y!i (s)$ y!#i (s)
&
+2)i
@y"i (s)
@s *
#
F#i (s) xi,i $ y!i (s)
$ 8i 2 fL;Rg :
Proof of Proposition 5
We proceed in two steps. First, we show that for i 2 fL;Rg, every possible policy (s; y) delivers
utility % 6!i (si; y!i (si) ;F ) for some si. Second, we show that 8i 2 fL;Rg , iís equilibrium utility 6!i
is equal to max
si
f6!i (si; y!i (si) ;F )g. These properties jointly imply that i 2 fL;Rg has no proÖtable
deviation and thus equilibrium.
Step 1
By Lemma 1, for any policy (s; y) that is not veto-proof or the status quo (which is the unique
veto-proof policy with score s0), entrepreneur i is weakly better o§ sitting out, i.e., 6!i (s; y;F ) %
6!i (s0; y0;F ) = 6
!
i (s0; y
!
i (s0) ;F ). Lemma 1 also implies that for any veto-proof policy (s; y) with
a score s > s0 where $i has no atom, 6!i (s; y;F ) < 6!i (s; y!i (s) ;F ). This takes care of all possible
policies for the always-active entrepreneur k, since in the strategy proÖles in Proposition 5 her
opponent has no atoms above s0.
It also takes care of almost all possible policies for the sometimes-inactive entrepreneur $k:
However, we must also show that for $k, the payo§ 6!#k (s; y^#k;F ) from developing any veto proof
policy (s; y^#k) with y^#k 6= y!#k (s;Fk (s)) at the score where k has an atom is weakly worse than the
payo§ 6!#k
%
s#k; y!#k (s#k) ;F
&
from developing the optimal-veto proof policy at some score s#k.
Let wk (y!k (s) ; y^#k) be the probability that kís policy is enacted when the entrepreneurs propose
policies (s; y!k (s)) and (s; y^#k) : Then $kís utility from developing (s; y^#k) is
$)#k
%
s+ y^2#k
&
+ Fk (s) [wk (y
!
k (s) ; y^#k)V#k (s; y
!
k (s)) + (1$ wk (y!k (s) ; y^#k))V#k (s; y^#k)]
+
Z
s
1
V#k (sk; y!k (sk)) dFk (5)
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Note that for$k to prefer to develop (s; y^#k) rather than (s0; y0) requires V#k (s; y^#k) > V#k (s; y!k (s))
so Equation 5 %
$)#k
%
s+ y^2#k
&
+ Fk (s)V#k (s; y^#k) +
Z
s
1
V#k (sk; y!k (sk)) dFk: (6)
But the argument for Lemma 1 implies that Equation 6 is strictly less than
lim
s!k!s+
0
6!#k
%
s#k; y!#k (s#k) ;F
&1
= $)#k
%
s+ y!#k (s)
&
+Fk (s)V#k
%
s; y!#k (s)
&
+
Z
s
1
V#k (sk; y!k (sk)) dFk:
Thus there must exist a score s+ 7 such that 6!#k
%
s+ 7; y!#k (s+ 7) ;F
&
is strictly greater than $kís
utility from developing (s; y^#k) :
Step 2
We argue that for each entrepreneur i, equilibrium utility 6!i is equal to maxsi
f6!i (si; y!i (si) ;F )g.
In the previous step we ruled out scores si < s0: Also note that for any policy at a score si > +s,
entrepreneur i is strictly better o§ developing y!i (+s; 1) ; because +s > s
!
i ; and as noted in our analysis
of the monopoly model the entrepreneurís utility from enacting (si; y!i (si)) and having it enacted
with probability 1 is strictly decreasing for si > s!i :
For entrepreneur $k, no score in (s0; s) ; can be optimal, because it would entail paying costs to
develop a policy that loses for sure. And the propositionís Örst boundary condition, which speciÖes
the size of kís atom at s ensures that $k is indi§erent between sitting out and developing a score at
s+ 7; i.e.,
0 = lim
s!k!s+
0
6!#k
%
s#k; y!#k (s#k) ;F
&1$6!#k %s0; y!#k (s0) ;F &
= Fk (s) 2x#k
%
y!#k (s;Fk (s))$ zk (s)
&$ )#k #s+ !y!#k (s)"2$ :
For entrepreneur k, the propositionís second boundary condition ensures that 6!k (s; y
!
k (s) ;F ) >
6!k (sk; y
!
k (sk) ;F ) ; 8sk < s; by specifying the size of $kís atom at s0. To derive the size of the
atom, we Örst note that for sk 2 [s0; s], a necessary condition for a policy (sk; y!k (sk;F#k)) to maxi-
mize kís utility is that y!k (sk;F#k) = zk (sk). Otherwise there exists a su¢ciently small ? such that
F#k (sk $ ?) = F#k (sk) and F#k (sk) * xk,k 2 (zL (sk $ ?) ; zR (sk $ ?)), and thus y!k (sk $ ?;F#k) =
y!k (sk;F#k) which would mean that 6
!
k (sk;F ) $ 6!k (sk $ ?;F ) = $)k?, i.e., (sk; y!k (sk;F#k))
couldnít maximize kís utility. Next, we set y!k (sk;F#k) = zk (sk) and di§erentiate Equation 4
to get
@
@sk
(6!k (sk;F )) = $)k
 
1 +
@ [z!k (sk)]
2
@sk
!
+ F#k (sk)
'
1 + 2xk
@z!k (sk)
@sk
(
: (7)
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For the equilibrium speciÖed in Proposition 5, this must be & 0 for sk < s. In fact it must be equal
to 0 at s. To see why, note that for any sk where F#k is continuous,
$)k
 
1 +
@ [z!k (sk)]
2
@sk
!
+ F#k (sk)
'
1 + 2xk
@z!k (sk)
@sk
(
% $)k
0@1 + @
#
[y!k (sk;F#k)]
2
$
@sk
1A+ F#k (sk)'1 + 2xk @y!k (sk;F#k)
@sk
(
by Lemma 1, and f#k (sk) * 2xk
%
y!k (sk;F#k)$ y!#k (sk;Fk)
& & 0, so the di§erential equation in
the propositionís third condition for s + " with " su¢ciently small could not be satisÖed unless
the boundary condition holds with equality. The boundary condition is then derived by setting
(7) equal to 0 at s, plugging in for z!k (sk) and
@z"k(sk)
@sk
, using DeÖnition 1 in the main text to get
F#k (s) = )k
jxbV kj+2jzk(s)j
jxbV kj+2jxkj :
The coupled di§erential equations in the propositionís third condition are derived by di§eren-
tiating Equation 4 for each entrepreneur and setting it equal to zero to ensure that her payo§
6!i (si; y
!
i (si) ;F ) is constant on the interval [s; s] where the entrepreneurs mix continuously. Specif-
ically, for each i 2 fL;Rg
0 =
@6!i (s; y
!
i (s) ;F )
@s
= $)i $ 2)iy!i (s)
@y!i (s)
@s
+ F#i (s)
7
1 + 2xi
@y!i (s)
@s
8
+ f#i (s) * 2xi
%
y!i (s)$ y!#i (s)
&
)i $ F#i (s) = f#i (s) * 2xi
%
y!i (s)$ y!#i (s)
&
+ 2)i
@y!i (s)
@s
*
'
F#i (s)
xi
)i
$ y!i (s)
(
:
!
Intuition and Computational Procedure Deriving equilibria satisfying the conditions in Propo-
sition 5 is cumbersome to do analytically, but straightforward to do numerically. The di§erential
equations and boundary conditions that deÖne the equilibrium score CDFs (Fk; F#k) can be intu-
itively understood by considering the incentives of each entrepreneur. First, the entrepreneur k who
is always active knows that her competition will develop no policy (i.e., propose the status quo) with
probability F#k (s0) > 0. Thus, increasing her score over the interval [s0; s] will not generate any
beneÖts in the form of increasing the chance of winning the contest. She must therefore actively pre-
fer to develop a policy with score s > s0 over policies with lower scores that will win the contest with
the same probability. This generates the boundary condition on F#k (s). Second, the entrepreneur
$k who is sometimes inactive must be exactly indi§erent between staying out of the policy contest,
and entering the contest with a policy at score s > s0. This policy has strictly positive quality, and
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therefore a strictly positive up-front cost to develop. She must then also have a strictly positive
probability Fk (s) of winning the contest with it, which generates the second boundary condition.
The di§erential equations in Proposition 5 arise from the fact that both entrepreneurs must be
indi§erent over developing all ideologically optimal veto proof policies with scores in the common
support interval [s; s]. Note that both di§erential equations contain both score CDFs Fk and F#k,
a complication that arises from the partial dependence of each entrepreneurís optimal ideologies
y!i (si) on her opponentís score CDF F#i. Nevertheless, the incentives described by the di§erential
equations are intuitive. The left hand side represents the marginal cost of producing a policy with a
higher score given a Öxed probability F#i (s) of winning the contest. The two terms in the right hand
side represent the marginal beneÖt of producing a policy with a higher score, which is two-fold. First
(and as in Hirsch and Shotts (2015a) it increases the probability of victory by f#i (s), which results
in a beneÖcial change in ideological outcomes from y!#i (s) to y
!
i (s). Second, if policy is constrained
by an opposing veto player (F#i (s) xi,i 6= y!i (s)), then there is an additional beneÖt of moving policy
closer to the unbounded optimum.
To characterize equilibria, we proceed as follows. For each set of parameter values, we Örst
verify whether pure strategy equilibria exist by checking the conditions in Proposition 4. Then,
for parameters such that a pure strategy equilibrium does not exist we compute mixed strategy
equilibria as follows. We conjecture an entrepreneur k who is always active and then search over
candidate values of s 2 [s0; s!k] to support a mixed strategy equilibrium. An equilibrium is identiÖed
when the score CDFs satisfying the boundary conditions at the candidate s and the pair of coupled
di§erential equations also satisfy the required boundary condition F#k (+s) = Fk (+s) = 1 at some +s
(this boundary condition is implicit in the statement of equilibrium because the support of the CDFs
is common and atomless above s). In all the parameter proÖles we have considered for which a pure
strategy equilibrium does not exist, there exists exactly one mixed strategy equilibrium that satisÖes
the su¢cient conditions in Proposition 5.
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